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AN INVESTIGATIONOFREPORTSOFCONTROLLED
FLIGHTTOWARDTERRAIN(CFTT)
Richard F. Porter and JamesP. Loomis
Battelle ColumbusLaboratories
SUMMARY
This report describes a study of reports in the files of the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) which are relevant to the hazard of flight into
terrain with no prior awareness by the crew of impending disaster.
Some 258 reports, from the more than 23,000 documents in the ASRS
data base, were found to be relevant to the general problem area. These were
examined in detail to identify the human and system factors which are condu-
cive to CFTT events and to safe recovery from such incidents when they occur.
The results of this study indicate that human error was a casual
fartor in 64% of the incidents in which some threat of terrain conflict was
experienced. Approximately two-thirds of the human errors were attributed to
controllers, the most common discrepancy being a radar vector below the
Minimum Vector Altitude (MVA). Errors by pilots were of a much more diverse
nature and include a few instances of gross deviations from their assigned
altitudes.
The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and the Minimum Safe Alti-
tude Warning (MSAW) equipment were the initial recovery factor in some 18
serious incidents and were apparently the sole warning in six reported
instances which otherwise would most probably have ended in disaster.
INTRODUCTION
The early 1970's were marked by a dramatic series of Controlled-
Flight-lnto-Terrain (CFIT)* fatal accidents. On December 1, 1974, TWA Flight
*Those accidents in which an aircraft, under the control of the crew, is flown
into terrain (or water) with no prior awareness on the part of the crew of
the impending disaster.
514, a Boeing 727 inbound to Dulles from Columbus, Ohio, struck a mountain,
after prematurely descending below a sa_e enroute altitude, due to ambiguities
in the pilot-controller communication ter_inology and navigation charts. This
accident served as a watershed for important accident prevention developments.
One of these was an amendment to Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121 to
require that all large turbine-powered aircraft be equipped with a Ground
Proximity Warning System (GPWS). Another was the initiation of the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) of which this report is a part.
The years following 1974 have been marked by a widely recognized
reduction in CFIT-type accidents, at least in scheduled air carrier service.
Notwithstanding controversy over the "false alarm" problem, some believe these
improvements are attributable to GPWS and the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
(MSAW) system later installed in the ARTS-3 terminal area radar systems.
An examination of ASRS reports relating to reported hazards involving
terrain and/or obstacles is of significant interest. First, it offers an
opportunity to identify new or recurrent problem areas which may pose a hazard
to flight. Further, it offers a most interesting chance to review the i_npact
of GPWS and MSAW implementation on the CFIT accident regime.
OBJECTIVE
The objectives of this research task were to <I) identify those hu_an
and system factors which facilitate the occurrence of CFTT events and which
preclude their termination as an accident, and (2) to understand the impact of
the introduction of Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS) and Minimum Safe
Altitude Warning (MSAW).
APPROACH
The earliest reports in the ASRS data bases date from July of 1976.
In order to extend the study back as close to the height of the CFIT problem
era, the search for appropriate ASRS reports was focused on the period from
July 1976 through October 1980. This data base contained approximately 23,000
reports.
In developing a strategy for identifying appropriate reports, it was
necessary to broadly define the type of situations and/or occurrences being
sought. In general, three broad categories were sought:
• Actual occurrences in which, except for an intervention that
occurred or by chance, it is believed that the aircraft would have
come in contact with terrain, bodies of water, or obstacles such
as towers, tanks, smokestacks, or buildings
• Situations which are believed to be conducive to an aircraft
inadvertently coming into contact with terrain, bodies of water,
or obstacles
• Actual occurrences in which a GPWS or MSAW system issued a false
or inappropriate alarm.
While the third category above did not directly relate to controlled flight
toward terrain, it was judged important because false alarms stand to influ-
ence the credibility of alarms or create new hazards (e.g., loss of aircraft
control due to distraction).
As a first step toward getting insight into the CFTT arena, it was
planned that the selected reports would be classified into whatever categories
the data might suggest. The descriptive statistics of each category would
then be developed and studied. Finally, it was intended that a more qualita-
tive analysis would be undertaken to better understand the hazards involved
and the related event s_quences and recovery factors.
RESULTS
Initially, the data base search described above yielded some 383
reports describing some 363 unique* situations/occurrences. An analysis of
the substance of these reports forced a refinement of the definition of the
CFTT study scope and resulted in the discard of some reports. Examples of
situations/occurrences excluded from this initial document set include the
following:
* Multiple reports are sometimes received describing a specific occurrence or
situation.
There were quite a few reports where the reporter was describing
unstabilized final approaches resulting from poor vectoring pro-
cedu_es or pilot technique. These were excluded because the
threat of collision with terrain _ertains to loss of control
rather than a situation where there is no awareness of an impend-
ing collision with terrain
There were several incidents in which an acute awareness of ter-
rain, and efforts to stay clear of it, led to other problems such
as a near mid-air collision with another aircraft
• There were someincidents where either turbulence aloft or wind-
shear on the final approach course brought the aircraft danger-
ously close to terrain
There were yet other reports describing low flying aircraft which
were deemedto have been illegally Io_ or otherwise flying
hazardously.
Classification of CFTTReports
The final documentset retained for study consisted of reports
describing 258 unique situations/occurrences. An examination of the document
set suggested that it would be useful to classify the reports into the six
categories defined in table I.
A word of explanation is in ordar concerning types I and II. These
are situations/occurrences in which the overall responsibility for what went
wrong is alleged to lie with a flight crew memberor a controller, respect-
ively. This does not meanthat there maynot be other underlying causes for
what transpired. Further, the selection of these six categories does not
preclude the examination of phenomenathat may involve more than one of these
categories (e.g., incidents in which a GPWSprevented collision with terrain).
Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 showsthe histograms of reporting frequency for all of the
six types defined in table I.
TABLEI. DEFINITIONOFTHETYPESOF
SITUATIONSOROCCURRENCESUSED
Designation Description
iT e
II.
Ill.
IV.
Vl
VI.
Proble,ns arising from flight crew errors involving
navigation, altitude control, or aircraft configur-
ation
Problems arising from inappropriate ATC vectors or
clearances, or deviation from standard procedures
Problems with charts concerning altitude retric-
tions, or qualifications in case of loss of commun-
ications, configuration of airspace, or established
procedures
Problems connected with unlighted or unmarked
towers, tanks, etc., or obstacles ineffectively
lighted or marked
Problem.s arising from inadequate or unreliable
approach aides, enroute aides, or use thereof
Problems arising from false or believed inappropri-
ate activation of GPWS or MSAW devices.
/
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!
ms
There is no obvious reason for the noticeable peak in reports
received in early 1978. In fact, both 1977 and 1978 exhibit significantly
greater numbers of reports than do 1979 and 1980. Aside from this ano_naly,
the average number of CFTT reports received each month has stabilized at about
4.5 reports per month. There has been no significant trend in the last two
years which would suggest either an increase or decrease in the rate at which
CFTT reports are received by the ASRS.
Table 2 shows both the number of unique reports for each of the six
categorles and a breakdown of report frequency by type of reporter. As shown,
the greatest number of reports occurred in category II where ATC vectoring or
clearances were alleged to be the main problem. The next most reported cate-
gory was V where the problem involved landing aids. Overall, flight crew
members were the most frequent reporters, accounting for about 68 percent of
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TABLE 2. REPORTED SITUATIONS OR OCCURRENCES
BY TYPE AND REPORTER
--_Yl)e of
Situation/
Occurrence
P_I ot or
By Reporter
Total Crew Member Control Ier Other
I. 43 28 15 0
II. 83 48 31 4(a)
Ill. 27 13 12 2(b)
IV. 24 22 1 I(b)
V. 52 37 14 1(b)
VI. 29 24 4 l(a)
Total s 258 172 77 9
(a) US Air Force HATR Reports.
(b) Unknown.
the reports. Only for category III (problems with charts, etc.) did
controllers report as often as pilots.
Each report of a situation or occurrence has implications regarding
hazards to flight in one or more flight regimes. For example, in a case such
as an unlighted tower near an active airport, both the climb (departure) and
initial approach flight regimes might logically be affected. Table 3 traces
these hazards to the various flight regimes by type of situation/occurrence.
Since more than one flight regime may be affected, 332 flight regime impacts
exist as a consequence of the 258 situation/occurrence reports.
It was naturally of interest to examine statistics relating to type
of aircraft, number of engines, type of aircraft operator. However, it was
concluded that such statistics would be both meaningless and misleading for
"situations" vis-a-vis "occurrences." For example, if the pilot of a partic-
ular type of aircraft relates a concern about ambiguous minimum altitude
information contained on a chart and there is no evidence that he was involved
8TABLE 3. FLIGHT REGIMES AFFECTED BY THE REPORTED
SITUATIONS/OCCURRENCES EXAMINED
Type of Affected Flight Phase
Situation/ Initial Final
Occurrence Climb Cruise Descent Approach Approach
I. 8 3 5 14 24
II, 22 17 17 24 10
Ill. 9 10 5 6 9
IV. 18 7 1 i0 17
V. 3 3 2 7 48
VI. i i 4 5 22
Totals 61 41 34 66 130
m
in an incident revolving around this observation, then the type of aircraft is
not relevant. Accordingly, descriptive statistics on aircraft and operator
were developed for only occurrences. Of the 258 reports of situations/
occurrences, some 188 were judged to be occurrences. Tabl_ 'bows the
statistics developed.
Type ! Reports
As described in table I, Type I reports deal with CFTT incidents
arising from apparent flight crew errors involving navigation, altitude
control, or aircraft configuration. All of these reports describe a specific
occurrence, as opposed to a broader hazardous situation.
Type I Statistics. Type I reports, 43 in number, comprise about 17%
of the total study document set. Most (75%) were submitted by the pilot while
the remainder were submitted by controllers.
The distribution of Type I reports, by year, is given in _able _.
L
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TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF TYPE I REPORTS BY YEAR
Year No. of Reports
1976 (last six months) i
1977 ¢
1978 15
1979 10
1980 (first ten months) 13
The frequency of these reports has not changed significantly in the
last 3 )ears, averaging slightly more than one report per month over the
36-month period.
No significant correlation is evident between the number of occur-
rences and the geographical location, if consideration is given to the rela-
tive traffic volumes at various sites. No individual location accounted for
more than three of the 43 occurrences, which, in total, were distributed among
34 separate locations which were identified.
Most of the incidents of Type I occurred at the destination of the
flight, with 68% occurring either during the Initial Approach or Final
Approach flight phases. Problems occurred with lesser frequenc_ in the Climb
(16%), Descent (10%), and Cruise (6%) flight phases.
Air Carrier aircraft were involved in 70% of the reported Type I
occurrences. The remainder described an incident involving a General Aviation
aircraft. Of the 14 General Aviation reports, the pilot experience level is
available in six, and the data indicate that these pilots were relatively
experienced. Only tw_ had less than 1000 hours, while the most experienced
had 20,000 hours.
Almost all _f the incidents (92%) occurred while the aircraft was on
an IFR flight plan, although the event occurred in VMC in about 40% of all
cases. Table 6 provides the distribution of the reports by lighting and mete-
orologica_ conditions. Two of the 43 reports are not represented in table 6
since they did not specify these factors.
t
II
TABLE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF TYPE I REPORTS BY
LIGHTING AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
IMC VMC Mixed UNK Total s
Day 9 12 3 0 24
Night 3 5 0 I 9
UNK 0 3 I 4 8
Totals 12 20 4 5 41
Nature of Occurrences. The nature of the Type I occurrences, as
categorized by the immediate cause of the potential conflict with terrain, is
given in table 7.
Each of the categories of table 7 is discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Altitude error - non-precision instrument approach: Nine of the Type
I occurrences (21%) were characterized by altitude discrepancies during non-
precision instrument approaches. The nine incidents may be segregated into
three sub-groups:
(1) Four cases in which the final approach descent was initiated
prematurely,
(2) Three cases in which the descent was initiated properly but
continued below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) without
proper visual contact with the airport, and
(3) Two cases in which the initial approach altitude was below the
published limit:
One of the premature descent incidents was apparently instigated by
an anomalous radiation pattern from a fan marker. A general aviatinn pilot
reported an erroneous aural signal, one mile before actually crossing the fix,
during a localizer back-course approach in IMC. He initiated the descent but
then noticed a second, strong aural signal during actual passage.
Force of habit contributed to the premature descent of another
general aviation pilot flying a Iocalizer approach at a strange airport. The
TABLE7.
12
NATUREOFTYPEI OCCURRENCES
Immediate Cause
NT.--oFT_cTd-6n-t-s ......................
Air Carrie_ Gen. Av. Totals
Altitude Error - Non-precision
Approach
Altitude Error - Precision
Approach
Deviation on Visual Approach
5 4 9
9 O 9
5 0 5
Lateral Deviation on Approach
Violation of IFR Altitude
Clearance
Unsafe Altitude - Visual Flight
Wrong Heading
Improper Flap Setting
Total s
3 I 4
4 0 4
0 3 3
i 2 3
2 0 2
30 13 43
usual procedure at his home base was to be vectored to the localizer at a
relatively high altitude. Then, when the localizer was captured, a descent
would be initiated to the LOM crossing altitude. In the case at hand, he was
vectored to the localizer at the LOM crossing altitude. At this point, his
Pavlovian response caused him to begin a descent to some undefined lower
altitude several miles outside of the marker. He caught his own mistake 300
feet below the proper altitude.
The apparent cause of the remaining two premature final descent inci-
dents was an error in identifying passage of the Final Approach Fix. Both
incidents took place in IMC.
One was in daylight over relatively flat terrain with ground contact
through scattered clouds. In this incident, the First Officer, flying a
localizer approach, incorrectly identified a position fix and prematurely
descended to an altitude 900 feet below the published altitude restriction for
_w_ _jL__ r • _ .......... _,_,_,,..........• ......
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his actual position. The Captain, handling the radio communications, did not
perform an adequate position check. The deviation triggered an MSAW alert.
The final incident in this sub-group occurred in IMC at night. The
report, by a controller, describes a near-disaster involving an air carrier
aircraft flying a localizer back-course approach:
"...Weather was poor (low ceiling, restricted visibility). Aircraft
was approximately 8-i/2 miles final (2-I/2 from FAF of Steve) when
low altitude alert sounded. Aircraft descended rapidly from 1700 ft.
to 600 ft. and was still descending when alerted by PHF tower after I
alerted them. Final Approach Fix altitude is 1700 feet. Aircraft
immediately began to climb back up and crossed Steve at 1700
feet...it appeared they may have thought they were at the FAF (Steve)
when they actually had only crossed Ripps Intersection inbound."
_he second sub-grouping of non-precision approach errors is concerned
with improper descent below the MDA. Of the occurrences, two were reported by
the pilots and allow insight into the underlying causes. For example, this
report by a general aviation pilot flying a practice NDB approach over
unlighted terrain, at night, tells it all:
"...Had a Private Pilot with 50-100 hrs. experience with me as check
pilot. During the approach descended below the MDA, (I) because I
forgot the correct altitude, (2) because I couldn't see the chart
(flood lighting inadequate), (3) because the check pilot didn't
correct me. Not being an IFR pi|ot he didn't know the critical
variables to watch, and at night in New Mexico it is quite dark.
There was a clear horizon, but the dark uninhabited surface was
difficult for him to see until the landing light hit it (50 feet!!).
,!
.B.
In less dramatic fashion, an air carrier pilot on a localizer back-
course approach reported that he descended to the MDA after passing the FAF
but, because of improper flying technique, overshot the descent sufficiently
to trigger an MSAW alert.
The last non-precision MDA violation was reported by a controller,
whose vigilance most probably prevented a major catastrophe. The aircraft was
a 4-engine heavy transport flying an NDB approach in IMC.
"Aircraft was cleared for an IORapproach.... He crossed
Grandview at 2300 and began descent to minimumsfor _unwayIOR (1300
MSL). I observed his altitude readout at II00 MSLapproximately 3
mile final. The low altitude ala_ failed to work. I i_._,_ediately
advised the to_er, who advised the aircraft at once.... Ground
witnesses say that the aircraft missed the Historical Society
building by about i00 feet..."
The failure of the MSAWto prov:de a warning signal in the preceding
report was alleged to be caused by maintenance personnel turning off the
system without notice.
The remaining two non-precision approach occurrences concerned air-
craft flying the initial approach below the published altitude. Neither may
have presented an _ctual hazard since they occurred in daylight in VMC.
Nevertheless, after radar service had been tem_inated and the aircraft was off
frequency, a controller observed a twin piston-engine air carrier aircraft
1800 feet below the minimumsafe altitude for the NDBapproach for which it
had been cleared. In the oth._r incident, a general aviation pilot, flying a
practice VORapproach, misinterpreted the approach plate and descendedbelow
the minimumoutbound altitude. A controller observed the ModeC read out and
alerted the pilot through the FSS.
Altitude error - precision approach: Precision approach errors
provided as manyType I reports (9) as did the non-precision incidents. All
of the reports in the precision approach sub-group pertain to air carrier
aircraft.
Three of the reports described altitude errors during the initial
approach phase, prior to crossing the outer marker. A controller reported one
of these, which occurred in daylight VMC. Whenadvised that they were 700
feet below the glide slope altitude at the approach fix, the crew asked for,
and received a clearance for a visual approach. The cause of the incident was
not reported, in the second occurrence, a perpendicular intercept of the
localizer was too demanding for a First Officer with little recent experience.
He lost excessive altitude during the turn and crossed the marker 500 feet
below the proper altitude. The third !nit!el approach occurrence was attri-
buted to a high cockpit workload, primarily caused by two changes in the
15
assigned runway. As a result, the aircraft was allowed to overshoot its des-
cent by 600 feet. The first warning came from the GPWS, although the aircraft
was clear of clouds at the ti_;le.
The r_naining six incidents in this subgroup were deviations below
the glide slope inside of the outer marker, and three of these were caused by
erroneous indications from flight directors.
In one of the flight director malfunctions, the error was detected
almost immediately by the non-flying pilot, presumably by cross-checking with
raw glide slope information. In the other two incidents, no such cross-check
was evident, and the situations deteriorated until the crews were warned by
the GPWS and by an alert controller, respectively. Both of the latter inci-
dents were in VMC, but the GPWS warning came during a night approach over
water.
In another occurrence involving an equipment failure, the autopilot
of a 3-engine wide-body aircraft failed to lock onto the glide slope, possibly
because of an expedited descent for vertical separation from another aircraft.
The failure was observed immediately, but the aircraft descended 800 feet
below the published altitude before a manual recovery was _ade. The altitude
deviation also caused a low alert on the approach controllers equipment.
One incident occurred in daylight in excellent visibility. In fact,
the good weather was a contributing factor. The distraction of looking for
other aircraft, in response to numerous traffic advisors, caused the pilot to
drop somewhat low on the glide slope during an approach to LAX on a beautiful
Saturday afternoon.
The final occurrence in this subgroup concerned a last minute change
in runway assignment at night in VMC. A relatively inexperienced First Offi-
cer forgot tO retune the ILS, but somehow managed to fly a complete approach
using the flight director. The GPWS alert was ignored as a false alarm. The
report, by the errant pilot, implies that the Captain was fully aware of the
blunder but did not interfere since the runway was i,l sight and the approach
was satisfactory.
Deviation on visual approach: Five Type I incidents occurred during
visual approaches, and all involved air carrier aircraft. Three of these were
16
created directly by an al_itude deviation; one was caused by a visual naviga-
tion error in the airport environment; and one was caused by a combination of
mountainous terrain, other traffic, and a night-time environment.
The first altitude deviation case was created by a communication dys-
function between a controller and the flight crew of a wide-body transport.
While ten miles from the airport, and over water, the crew were told by
Approach Control that they were cleared for a visual approach. What they were
not told, either by the controller or the current ATIS message, was that the
glide slope was out of service. Since company policy required the use of all
available aids, and since no flags were showing, the copilot used erroneous
glide slope indications to descend in VMC with restricted visibility. At this
point, to quote from the report--"...I became aware of high rise buildings
coming into view and the GPWS sounded off .... "
A non-standard instrument panel contributed to the second occurrence.
In daylight, with good visibility, the pilot relied entirely on the runway and
his projected touchdown point for visual interpretation of azimuth and verti-
cal profile. The flight director was not monitored because it was nonstandard
and wasn't located where he was accustomed to looking for glide slope informa-
tion. As a result, he drifted below the electronic glide slope sufficiently
to trigger the GPWS. The approach was continued and the landing was made
without difficulty.
In the remaining low-altitude occurrence, the pilot of a four-engine
wide body violated his altitude clearance within the Airport Traffic Area
while being vectored downwind for a visual approach. No reason for the alti-
tude discrepancy was given in the report by a controller.
The remaining two cases in this sub-group were incidents of genuine
peril, wherein the pilots lost sight of the airport after accepting visual
approach clearances. The first occurred in hazy daylight in a major metro-
politan area:
"Aircraft was being vectored to an ILS final for Runway 21 Left.
When he was on base leg Northeast of the airport, the aircraft
eported the airport in sight and requested a visual approach. The
Approach Controller issued the visual approach clearance and changed
the aircraft to tower frequency. The aircraft turned southbound and
17
did not call the tower. The tower controllers noticed the aircraft
on radar with the low altitude alert.., the aircraft was observed at
1700 MSL 1-I/2 miles north of the WJR radio antenna, 1311MSL. At
this time the aircraft called the tower. Went in descent to 1400 MSL
and flight radar target touched the radar marking of the antenna.
Aircraft then climbed to 3000 feet and was vectored for an ILS
approach."
The radio antenna mentioned in the preceding report is directly abeam
of the runway, but nearly 7 nautical miles to the left of the centerline. It
seems clear that the crew either did not have visual contact when they
requested the clearance; or, if they did, they lost contact and did not admit
their problem.
The final case could have been categorized as a Type II incident
because of questionable controller judgment; nevertheless, it is included in
Type I because it would have been prudent for the reporting pilot to refuse a
visual approach under the conditions which existed:
"...Approach called to advise we were No. 3 behind Aircraft B on 15
mile final. The approach turned us to a heading of 020 degrees. I
couldn't see where No. I was .... I saw Aircraft B but didn't know it
was him. He had his ground flood lights on. So did I, but Aircraft
C didn't. As we came closer and cleser, I began to realize what a
bad call Approach had made. Our heading had taken us behind a 7000
ft. mountain... Approach cleared us for a visual with Aircraft B
about 2 miles in front of us. So here we were headed up a mountain
pass with a IO,000 ft. mountain in front of us, a 9,000 ft. mountain
to our right and (the 7,000 ft. mountain) about a quarter mile to our
left. I knew where I was because I grew up in (the area) and learned
to fly in that mountain pass. We couldn't see the mountains. It was
very dark. There was no moon and not even a cloud deck to reflect
the city lights onto the hills...l told the copilot to start a turn
to the left. At that time, we crossed the center line to Runway 26.
B had just been there. We hit his vortex, and in his
configuration.., it tossed us around violently. We were in a 30
degree bank to the left when we hit it. The copilot had started a
18
descent. I told him to hold 8,000 ft. and cdlled approactl and asked
him how far we were behind B. Approach answered '2 miles'. I aske_:
what our speed was in relation to B and was told we were 30 knots
faster. I told the copilot to put us on a heading of 190 degrees.
Again (the 7,000 ft. mountain) was off to our left, but I felt a
little better this time because all we had in front of us was valley.
After another 130 degee turn to the right followed by a 90 degree
turn to the left, we landed on Runway26 just as B cleared the
runway.... "
Deviation from departure procedure: Pilot errors during instrument
departures led to four Type I incidents. In one, a general aviation pilot in
IMCwas cleared direct to a VORafter takeoff but mistakenly flew the recipro-
cal course toward high terrain. An alert controller caught the error.
The three other cases consisted of failure of air crews to adhere to
the proper published departure procedures. One report, by a controller,
describes a wrong turn by the pilot of a light turboprop transport which
placed the aircraft in proximity to high terrain. The controller promptly
advised the pilot of the error and provided vectors to re-establish the proper
departure course.
Both of the remaining incidents involved three-engine wide-body air-
craft departing from San Francisco. A controller reported that one of these
started to fly a Shoreline 5 departure, a VMC procedure, with stratus clouds
in the area, instead of the assigned SF2 standard departure. The erroneous
turn was observed and corrected by the Departure Controller.
In the remaining case, the Miami-based Captain's report suggests that
a post-midnight departure f_om San Francisco created a sufficient disturbance
to the crew's circadian rhythm to induce a serious lack of mental alertness.
As a consequence, the First Officer delayed an assigned right turn after take-
off until he was reminded by the Captain. The late turn brought them into
proximity to San Bruno Mountain, but neither crew member was aware of the
hazard until the Departure Controller advised them of an altitude alert
(MSAW).
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Lateral deviation on approach: Pilot errors contributed four
instances of gross lateral deviation from the localizer path during ILS
approaches.
Only one of these occurrences involved an air carrier aircraft.
Exceptionally high winds of ur,Knownmagnitude caused the aircraft to drift
toward high terrain while attempting to capture the localizer, following a
non-standard holding pattern maneuver. The first warning was a GPWSalert
which prompted the pilot to initiate an immediate climb and turn. Along with
the basic cause, which was the high velocity wind, were the associated factors
of an inadequate crew briefing on non-standard actions, inadequate information
or alerts on the winds aloft, and a low experience level of the First Officer.
Another serious incident in this sub-group occurred during an improp-
erly flown missed approach by a corporate jet crew. Tower visibility at the
time was 1/8 of a mile. The RVRwas 3400 feet in freezing drizzle, light snow
and fog. Perhaps the only favorable circumstance was that it happenedin day-
light. A controller reported the occurrence as follows:
"...On a very short final, pilot advised missed approach. I issued
'Fly runway heading, maintain 2500 feet.' At this time we heard a
very loud jet engine noise coming from the East side of the tower,
when the runway is West of the tower approximately 250-300 yards.
...An aircraft waiting for departure told a controller later that he
had observed the aircraft about 300 East of the runway and
'...it just missed hitting the tower.'"
The pilots perspective of this incident would be interesting, but no
pilot report was received by the ASRS. It seems probable that high cockpit
workload was a factor, but there is no information to reveal when the situa-
tion began to deteriorate.
An inexperienced instrument pilot, in a small single-engine aircraft,
overflew the localizer on a published transition route and continued into an
area of high terrain. With no radar coverage, the hazard became known only
when the pilot informed the controller. The controller immediately cleared
the aircraft for a climb above the overcast and suggested maintaining VFR
until oriented.
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Another general aviation pilot was observed by a Center controller to
be tracking a localizer course, but displaced 5 miles to the side near moun-
tainous terrain. Using the airport tower controller to relay communications,
the alert Center controller suggested a revised heading. The pilot later
claimed that he was receiving erroneous information from his instruments.
Violation of IFR altitude clearance: Three of the four IFR altitude
clearance violations involved a misunderstanding of the assigned altitude,
while the fourth was caused by distraction. All cases in this subgroup
involved air carrier aircraft.
The largest error, a blunder of no less than 24,000 feet, occurred
during a night departure from Salt Lake City. The copilot copied the clear-
ance altitude as 7000 feet (the number left in the altitude alerter from the
arrival) instead of the correct value of 31,000 feet. The Captain, who had
been busy on another radio when the departure clearance was received, did not
question the clearance. After takeoff, the Captain became concerned and quer-
ied the controller, whereupon the mistake was discovered. Immediately after
initiating a climb, the GPWS sounded a terrain warning, caused by an island in
the Great Salt Lake with a peak near 6650 feet.
Another flight crew accepted what they thought was a clearance to
4000 feet during a descent to Albuquerque--a questionable figure in view of
the fact that the field elevation is 5352 feet. The captain put 400U in the
altitude alert window and the First Officer read back the clearance to 4000
feet. The read-back was not challenged by the controller, who had actually
assigned 14,000 feet. The problem became apparent when the flight emerged
from clouds in time to take evasive action to avoid Sandia Peak.
In another case, the flight crew of a 4-engine wide-body aircraft
climbed to 1700 feet while departing JFK, instead of the assigned 17000 feet.
The pilot reported level at 1700 and questioned the assignment, whereupon the
misunderstanding was corrected.
In the remaining altitude violation, a pilot was distracted from his
flying duties by making a P.A. announcement to his passengers. As a conse-
quence, he strayed 1000 feet below a crossing altitude restriction during
descent in mountainous terrain. The incident occurred at night in VMC.
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Unsafe altitude--visual flight: There were three reports of real or
potential hazards caused by insufficient altitude in visual flight. These
reports were submitted by general aviation pilots.
Onereport described a genuinely haTardous situation brought about by
extreme fatigue:
"I was flying for a cargo outfit at the time. I had been averaging
12 hours a day duty time. We...also do all our own loading and
unloading. I had been on duty since I a.m° the previous night,
flying around 7 hours.... was flying back to our homebase empty. I
was the only one in the airplane on a 15 mile leg .... I uncon-
sciously began a descent for MIC airport. Before I realized what
altitude I was at, I broke my stare and began a fast angle of climb
to gain altitude, for I had dipped downto around 500 feet or so.
D!
.em
The second occurrence could have been very serious in IMC. The pilot
of a small single-engine aircraft, in mountainous terrain in clear weather,
observed that his true altitude was much lo_ver than the altimeter would have
him believe. Furthermore, his airspeed and rate-of-climb readings were erra-
tic. Later examination revealed that there were, indeed, bugs in the air-
craft's system--specifically, two or three small wasp-like creatures in the
pit.t/static fixture.
The last report in this subgroup described a relatively benign event
which serves to illustrate that a pilot operating VFR is totally responsible
for his own altitude discipline. Following the tower's instructions to fly a
right traffic pattern instead of the left pattern he had expected, the pilot
found himself over rising terrain that reduced his altitude above the ground
to 500 feet or less.
Wrong heading: In three instances, pilots flew incorrect headings
while operating IFR, creating a potential conflict with terrain.
An air carrier crew found themselves flying toward high terrain at
their assigned altitude of 13,000 feet. When the Center asked if they were
proceeding as filed, the pilot discovered he was tracking the wrong VOR radial
2__
and had deviated substantially from his intended airway, which passed over
lower terrain. An immediate clearance was given to 15,000 feet.
During descent in IMC, an erroneous ADF indication prompted the pilot
of a light twin to fly a heading which could have led to a terrain conflict.
An alert center controller detected the track deviation and provided radar
vectors to the destination airport.
Radio communication difficulties figured prominently in the last case
in this subgroup. A corporate aircraft in IMC had only intermittent and garb-
led contact with the reporting controller. In the confusion, the aircraft
flew a heading intended for another aircraft with a _omewhat similar tail
nu_er. The aircraft also descended 1700 feet below nearby terrain. Fortun-
ately, another ATC facility was able to regain contact with the aircraft.
Improper flap setting for landing: Two instances were reported by
pilots who experienced GPWS warnings on final approach because of improper
flap configuration. In one case, the pilot assumed the alert was a false
alarm, since his VASI indication appeared normal. In the other, the Captain
of a wide-body aircraft correctly identified the problem when the GPWS was
activated at 500 feet during a visual approach in haze. He immediately
selected the proper flap setting and an uneventful landing followed.
Type II Reports
Type II reports cover CFTT incidents arising from apparent controller
errors, in the opinion of the reporter, in the form of inappropriate ATC vec-
tors or clearances, or deviations from standard procedures.
Nature of occurrences. The Type II occurrences are categorized in
table 9 according to the nature of the problem as perceived by the reporter.
Each of the categories of table 8 are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Cleared below minimum legal altitude: More than half of the Type II
reports (45) describe occurrences in which an aircraft was assigned an
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TABLE8. NATUREOFTYPEII OCCURRENCES
Immediate Cause
No. of Incidents
Air Carrier Gen. Av. Military Total s
Cleared Below MinimumLegal
Altitude 15
Neglected While On Radar
Vectors 0
Given AmbiguousClearance 5
Given Legal But Disconcerting
Clearance 6
Given Heading Toward Higher
Terrain 3
Cleared With Impaired ILS 4
Miscellaneous 0
TOTALS 33
21 9 45
5 4 9
3 0 8
2 0 8
2 0 5
1 0 5
2 1 3
36 14 83
altitude below the minimumrequired by the Federal Air Regulations or by the
standards of the Air Traffic Control System. Most of these reports (26) were
submitted by controllers.
In 40 of the 45 incidents, the aircraft were on IFR flight plans;
while in the remaining five cases, the aircraft were receiving headings and
altitude assignments within a Terminal Control Area (TCA).
The lighting and meteorological conditions are given in table 9.
Eleven incidents in this category occurred during the initial
approach phase. These events are outlined in figure 2. All but one of the
aircraft were being radar vectored at the time of the incident. In the
singular case, a military fighter was flying a published STARapproach when
instructed by the controller to discontinue and descend to 3000 feet. The
clearance was later amendedto return to the STARprofile, but the correct
altitude was not restated by the controller. As a result, the aircraft flew
through an area 1000 feet below the MVA.
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LIGHTING AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIPNS FOR
INCIDENTS IN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT WAS CLEARED
BELOW THE MINIMUM LEGAL ALTITUDE
IMC VMC Mi xed UNK Total s
Day 13 15 2 3 33
Night 5 2 I I 9
Dusk 0 2 0 I 3
Totals 18 19 3 5 45
While all of the remaining initial approach incidents in this group
involved aircraft on radar vectors, one of these concerned a 5300-hour general
aviation pilot operating with no flight plan in a TCA. He reported being
assigned an altitude only 700 feet above a congested area and 200 feet over
open land while complying with radar vectors. The other nine incidents were
in violation of the Minimum Vector Altitude (MVA) requirement for IFR traffic.
In six of these, the aircraft were simply given an inadequate altitude
assignment; while in three, the aircraft was permitted to fly into a higher
MVA area through faulty planning Dy the controller.
The reason for the inadequate altitude assignment was not given in
three cases. An air carrier aircraft was vectored 800 feet below the MVA over
a large metropolitan area in IMC at night before the controller realized the
error. Similarly, a military transport, being vectored for a GCA approach at
night in VMC, was told to descend 1500 feet below the MVA. The controller
caught his mistake when the aircraft was only 300 feet above the erroneously
assi_n_ =I._.,A_ The fi
.... _ ..... nal unexpl _n_u, ,,,=u error In this sub-group was primar-
ily an error in the positioning of a fighter aircraft being vectored for a GCA
approach in IMC in mountainous terrain:
"...descent to 4100 MSL directed by Approach Control. Pilot elected
to maintain 4800 MSL, being west of course. Pilot reported passing
within 3000 feet laterally of 4314 foot spot elevation with 4108 foot
spot elevatioa 3 miles at 12 o'clock to ground track..."
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In three incidents, a reason for the altitude clearance discrepancy
is either explicitly stated or implied. In one case, a controller trainee
transposed the numbers in an altitude clearance, descending an air carrier
aircraft to 2300 feet instead of 3200 and generating an MSAW alert. In
another, a controller confused two radar targets at a facility with no ARTS or
MSAW capability, thereby vectoring a corporate aircraft over mountains below
the MVA and at the same altitude as the peaks. The incident happened at dusk
in unspecified meteorological conditions. The third case took place at night
in restricted visibility. The narrative speaks for itself:
"...We were being vectored to the final approach course. Our flight
was told to turn left to a heading and descend to 3000. Clearance
was acknowledged. Then a new voice gave us a further turn to the
left and to maintain 2000. This clearance was acknowledged by read-
ing back the heading and altitude. At approximtely 2500 feet MSL,
this new voice, which was very deep and seemed to be mumbling into
the microphone, said something to our flight, but the only thing any
of us in the cockpit understood was the words 'altitude alert'. I
then levelled the aircraft immediately...After two attempts the
controller spoke a little clearer and told us we were only cleared to
3000 feet...He apparently had just come on the midnight shift and was
very tired..."
As outlined in figure 2, three of the initial approach incidents in
this category were initially assigned a proper altitude but were inadvertently
vectored into an area with a higher MVA. In one of these, a controller was
distracted by radio communications and allowed an air carrier aircraft to vio-
late a 7300 foot MVA area while at 7000 feet. The crew reported a GPWS alert,
but the controller did not realize his error until the aircraft was out of the
hazardous area. In a similar incident, a military trainer in VMC was kept too
wide and violated a 9000 foot MVA at 7000 feet. In the last initial approach
incident, a controller underestimated the radius of turn of a fighter air-
craft, permitting a transgressien 2000 feet below a neighboring MVA and trig-
gering an MSAW alert. A contributing factor in this case was a late hand off
to the reporting controller.
Ten incidents in this category occurred while the aircraft was in the
descent phase. These are outlined in figure 3.
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All but one of the aircraft were on IFR flight plans. The sole
exception was following Stage III radar vectors in a TCA_t night. He com-
plained of being directed into mountainous terrain at an unsafe altitude.
As seen in figure 3, five of the IFR aircraft were on radar vectors
and each case cul_ninated in an MVAviolation. Three were simply cleared to
too low an altitude. Oneof these incidents was caused by the controller's
confusion of two military aircraft with similar call signs; while in another,
the flight crew transposed the numbersgiven for heading and altitude. The
crew read back the garbled clearance but were not corrected by the controller.
In two cases, a descending aircraft was given radar vectors into a region of
higher terrain. In one instance, a controller committed an error in judgement
in turning an air carrier aircraft for traffic separation, setting off both a
GPWSand MSAWalert. No explanation of the error was given in the other
report.
Three aircraft were cleared to descend below the MEAon airways, as
shownin figure 3. All three incidents were reported by the erring control-
lers themselves, one of _, _m"misoriented myself to the area". Another
descendedan air carrier aircraft below the 18,000 foot floor of a jet airway,
thinking there was a Victor airway underneath, which there was not. The third
controller descended a general aviation aircraft prematurely because of confu-
sion over MEAboundaries.
The remaining descent incident in this category concerns an air car-
rier aircraft which was following a published descent profile in mountainous
terrain:
"...Our arrival was via the (name) STAR. We were given a discre-
tionary descent to descend to and maintain 13,000 feet. During the
descent, we were recleared "Direct (name) VOR'. This placed us
inbound on the 281 radial. We arrived at 13,000 feet at approxi-
mately 33 DME. The flight conditions were IFR with the tops at
14,000 feet MSL. At approximately 30 DME, the GPWS activated a Mode
2 Excessive Closure Rate. We heard 'Terrain-Terrain-Pull Up'. I
immediately climbed the aircraft through 14,000 feet to about 14,300.
...Upon checking a WAC chart, I discovered the terrain altitude peak
was 11,918 feet. This ground proximity (1082 feet) coupled with
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mountainous terrain, suggests that the GPWSMode2 operated
correctly."
Ten reports in this category described unsafe altitude clearances
during the departure phase. These incidents are outlined in figure 4.
Half of the events occurred while the aircraft were on departure
radar vectors from takeoff, and three of these were departing VFR in a Termi-
nal Control Area. In each of these three cases, the reporting general avia-
tion pilot complained of an unsafe altitude assignment. Specifically, they
reported being vectored as low as 200 feet AGL and 400 feet over towers and in
one case, having radar service terminated at 1500 feet in a hazy metropolitan
area with 1349 foot towers in the vicinity.
Two of the departure radar vector incidents involved aircraft oper-
ating IFR. Both occurrences resulted in MVA violations. In one, an air
carrier aircraft was given a non-standard departure route over two other major
airports, instead of the usual SID. In the confusion, communication with the
aircraft was minimal and it flew 500 feet below the MVA directly over a large
city at night in IMC. In the other incident, the pilot of a general aviation
aircraft was given a clearance intended for a different aircraft. This
resulted in the aircraft flying 500 feet below the MVA in IMC.
Three occurrences began with Standard Instrument Departures (SID's)
which were modified, in flight, by the controllers. In one of these inci-
dents, a tower controller reported that he temporarily restricted a departing
light aircraft to an altitude below the MVA to provide visual separation with
another aircraft with which he could not communicate. In another case, a
general aviation pilot reported that a controller amended his SID clearance to
a heading which put the aircraft within 300 feet of a mountain peak and 200
feet from an antenna tower. The MSAW alert was triggered, but no action was
suggested to the pilot. Fortunately, the event took place in VMC which per-
mitred visual terrain avoidance. A very similar, but more hazardous, occur-
rence involved an air carrier aircraft departing on a SID in mixed meteoro-
logic_l conditions:
"...departure plate includes maintaining VFR until passing the 342
degree radial. After takeoff while beginning our right turn, the
tower advised us to roll out heading 350 degrees and contact Depar-
ture Control. This put us on a heading for the hills northwest of
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the airport, which at _hat time were obscured by clouds above I000
feet. Departure Control was busy with another aircraft so there was
a short delay in making contact. Just as they said 'radar contact',
we entered ;he clouds, clearing the hills by about 500 to 600 feet.
...I weui_ never nave accepted such a clearance from the ground up,
but in the mid-point of a turn in a congested area, plus cmnmunica-
tion saturation, there are virtually no alternatives."
The remaining two departure occurrences took place as the aircraft
were pruceeding, as cleared, from the runway to a VOR. In one case, the tower
controller transposed left and right in his clearance to turn after takeoff.
As a consequence, the aircraft came within 1000 feet of sharply rising terrain
in V_C. In the other, the reporting pilot complained to pressure from a
center controller to violate an MEA restriction:
"...the field elevation is 1483 feet and the ME& for first segment is
6000 feet. Since I was pilotin_ an aircraft with li_nited climb
performance, I intended to enter a holding pattern at the VOR and
gave my intentions to the tower. Halfway to the VOR I s_aitched over
to the Center and I was instructed to turn on course. I came back on
the radio in protest, stating my intentions to reach the NEA first.
At this point the controller demanded that I turn on course. Being a
rookie instrument pilot and since I had some visual contact with the
ground in light snow showers, I went along with him .... This area
does not have any sort of ASR radar .... "
Nine incidents in this category occurred during cruise flight under
IFR clearances. These are outlined in figure 5. In one unusual case, an
apparently spurious radar target was identified by the controller as a light
aircraft enroute through his sector. When the target subsequently disap-
peared, the controller called the aircraft and detemined that it was 15 miles
from the position he had identified and was below the MVA as well. Another
MVA violation was reported as a result of radar vectors to ensure separation.
Both aircraft were directed into terrain without proper ground clearance.
Six of the cruise incidents occurred while the aircraft was flying on
airways; and in four of these, the controller failed to climb the aircraft to
an altitude compatible with the next segment. For example, a controller was
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distracted in trying to locate a lost aircraft and permitted a general avia-
tion aircraft to enter the next sector 1000 feet below the MEA. A faulty data
strip marking contributed to another incident; the controller mistakenly
believed the aircraft to De VFR on top. In a third case, a military trainer
flew at dusk only 500 feet above mountain peaks because an amended clearance,
relayed through a Flight Service Station, did not reach the aircraft in time.
The fourth failure to climb was attributed to a lack of sector coordination.
In a totally different situation, a military helicopter pilot ques-
tioned an airways altitude assignment 1000 feet below the published MEA. His
protest was to no avail, the controller insisting the MEA was lower. The
resourceful pilot requested and received radar vectors to make his operation
legitimate.
In the last airways incident, the data strip for a light aircraft did
not contain the usual notation that the assigned altitude was inadequate for a
particular segment of the route. Nevertheless, an alert controller recognized
the discrepancy and climbed the aircraft before it penetrated the higher MEA
area.
The final cruise occurrence in this category involved a charter
flight flying an off-airways route. The crew apparently copied an altitude
clearance intended for a different flight and flew a substantial portion of
the trip below the MEA before the discrepancy was noted.
The final approach phase provided three occurrence reports in this
category. On two consecutive VOR approaches to a major hub airport, the
controller cleared an air carrier aircraft below the published minimums prior
to the pilot having the runway in sight. Both attempts ended in missed
approaches. In another case, a general aviation pilot was observed three
miles east of course while attempting an NDB approach at night in IMC.
Approach Control requested that the tower issue a missed approach, but the
tower refused and vectored the aircraft to final 600 feet below the MVA. In
the third case, a commuter pilot was requested to perform a 360 degree turn
for spacing on final approach. On radar vectors, the turn was extended into
an area with a higher minimum altitude requirement.
Two incidents in this category occurred during missed approaches. In
one, a 400 hour general aviation pilot complained of being vectored 200 feet
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below the MVA in IMC because the controller wanted 1000 feet of separation
with overhead traffic. Traffic was also a factor in the other incident. A
military transport on short final from an NDB approach requested a 360 degree
turn and vectors for an ILS approach. Because of traffic, he was assigned a
heading and an altitude which put him i000 feet below the MVA.
Neglected while on radar vectors: There were nine reports of inci-
dents in which an aircraft was forgotten, ignored, or otherwise left without
proper guidance while on radar vectors. Seven of these reports were from
pilots while two were from controllers. In five of the cases, controller
workload was mentioned as a contributing factor.
No air carrier aircraft were involved--five were general aviation,
while four were military. All were on IFR flight plans except one which was
operating with no flight plan in a TCA.
The lighting and meteorological conditions are given in table 10.
TABLE 10. LIGHTING AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR INCIDENTS IN
WHICH THE AIRCRAFT WAS NEGLECTED WHILE ON RADAR VECTORS
IMC VMC Mixed Total s
Day 2 4 2 8
Night 0 1 0 I
Totals 2 5 2 9
Four of the nine incidents occurred as the aircraft were being vec-
tored during the initial approach phase. In the most hazardous of these, a
disaster was averted only because the crew of a military transport were prop-
erly aware of their position relative to high terrain, even though they were
in solid clouds. At 5000 feet, their assigned heading was directly toward a
5696-foot peak. After repeated attempts to contact Approach Control, all
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thwarted by frequency congestion, the pilot took evasive action on his own
authority. The evasive maneuver was initiated only three to five miles from
the peak, according to a post-flight analysis.
In the other three initial approach incidents, the aircraft were for-
tunate to be clear of clouds. This was particularly true in the case of a
reporting flight instructor:
"While on an IFR training flight (actual clearance) we received a
vector which would have flown us into a mountain since the controller
apparently forgot us .... continued flight would have impacted the
aircraft approximately 200-300 feet below the ridge top. After
crossing the ridge we asked for a freqency change and returned to
the base airport."
In one instance, the controller realized the situation in time to
advise a "sharp" right turn just one or two minutes from terrain conflict,
after vectoring a U.S. Government civil aircraft past the final approach
course. In this case, the pilot was aware of the hazard, having just broken
out of an overcast.
The last initial approach incident involved a forgotten fighter pilot
who steadfastly flew 38 miles on an assigned vector, among peaks in VMC,
before jogging the controller's memory.
Two incidents were reported of having been forgotten during the depar-
ture phase. In one case, a flight of two fighters was given a clearance to
climb to 7000 feet on an assigned heading. After a period of being distracted
by other traffic, the reporting controller remembered them in time to suggest
a "good rate of turn" less than a mile from a 9000 foot MOCA area. The other
departure occurrence concerned a general aviation pilot complying with radar
vectors while departing a TCA with no flight plan. His narrative reflects his
frustration at being placed in a "no-win" situation:
"...assigned heading 180 degrees and altitude 3500 feet. Unable to
establish contact with Departure/Approach controller on multiple (at
least 4-5) attempts. Was about 500 feet AGL with approaching higher
terrain. Became apparent I would either have to (I) chance it on
being able to climb over the approaching mountains, (2) change head-
ing drastically, or (3)make an unauthorized climb. Chose last
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choice because I could hear controller clearing plan just aheadof me
to 6000 feet. I climbed to 4500 feet -probably violation of TCA.
Departure controller then immediately cameon frequency with reprl-
mandfor climb and indicated inbound plane passed i/4 mile away at
4000 feet - Did not see plane..."
Two pilots reported having been forgotten while on radar vectors
during cruise flight. A Navy helicopter was on a vector toward rising terrain
in IMC when the controller left the frequency for an unexplained reason.
After some delay communication was re-established on the guard frequency.
In the other crl,ise incident, an air taxi pilot reported flying
almost 50 miles in marginal VMC at an altitude below the MEA's of nearby air-
ways. The report gives no reason for the cavalier treatment alleged in the
narrative:
"...IFR cledrance as follows: ATC clears (flight) to the (name}
airport via radar vectors, maintain 2500 feet .... Tower instructed
the flight to contact (name} center on 127.1 (still within 1 n.m. of
the airport)_ The flight reported on frequency passing 2000 feet.
It was so confirmed. Approximately 15 n.m. west of the airport,
center was reminded that the flight was still at 2500 feet (our filed
request was 4000). That was greeted with a 'Roger'. Having exper-
ienced a similar situation twice in the past 8 months, the crew
elected to continue on the run,Jay heading at 2500 feet to see where
our 'Radar Vector' would take us .... by the time we were 2 miles
past our destination we again called center. When the controller
realized he did not know the position of an aircraft he was working
on an IFR clearance, his confusion was easy to understand .... "
In the final occurrence in this category, a controller acknowledged
his error in permitting a corporate jet to descend into an 8000 foot MVA area
at 7000 feet at night. In his own words: "As I was busy, I did not notice
that he was turning a little wider than usual and let him stray into the 8000
MV&."
Given ambiguous clearance: The eight reports in this category per-
tain to instances in which the clearance issued by ATC contained an important
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but unspoken restriction, or which left the flight crew in a state of uncer-
tainty with regard to their proper course of action. In each case, the ambig-
uity of the clearance could have led to a conflict with terrain.
All eight reports were submitted by pilots. Five of these were air
carrier pilots, while the remaining three were general aviation. All were on
IFR flight plans.
The lighting and meteorological conditions are listed in table 11.
TABLE 11. LIGHTING AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR INCIDENTS
IN WHICH FLIGHT CREWS WERE GIVEN AMBIGUOUS CLEARANCES
IMC VMC Mixed Unk Totals
Day 0 2 1 0 3
Night 1 1 0 0 2
Dusk 1 0 i 0 2
Unk 0 0 0 I 1
Totals 2 3 2 1 8
Unless the aircraft is established on a segment of a published route
or instrument approach procedure, FAR 91.116 (f) requires that, when an
approach clearance is received, a pilot shall maintain his last assigned alti-
tude unless a different altitude is assigned by ATC. Nevertheless, four
reports were received of instances in which the aircraft were simply "cleared
for the approach" from radar vectors or while otherwise in a position without
a published transition to the Final Approach Fix. Perhaps significantly, two
of these cases occurred outside of the United States.
One incident occurred during an approach by an air carrier aircraft
to an airport in Turkey. It was at dusk with heavy haze and the aircraft was
in a holding pattern over an area where the MEA is 4500 f_et. When cleared
for the approach, the pilots looked at the approach plate and decided they
could descend at their discretion to 3000 feet. The report was submitted by
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the Ca_tain who ex?ressed his appreciation for tile alertness of the Flight
Engineer, who requested that they level off at 45_0 feet until establishel on
the glide slope.
Another report by an air carrier pilot described a situation at an
airport of entry in Canada.
"...Several times at (name) airport, I have been on a vector for an
ILS ap2roach at an assigned altitude and cleared for the ai_proach
before intercepting the Iocalizer. It was impossible to make an
instrument approach unless I left my assigned altitude for the
minimum glide slope intercept altitude before I was established on
the Iocalizer. Most of the times a lower altitude was given, when
requested by me, from Approach Control. Today (mid-1973) we were
being vectoreJ...at an assigned altitude of 4000 feet. While south
of the local izer, we were cleared for the approach. We requested a
lower altitude (2400 feet cleared) but the controller would not issue
us another altitude but only said that we were cleared for the
ai_proach. To say the least, we were a little nigh when we broke out
of the overcast..."
While foreign controllers are not bound by the U.S. Federal Air Regu-
lations, controllers in the LInited States cert_inly are. Nevertheless, a
similar incident was reported by an air carrier p_lot Jt an airport in the
midwest. The scenario began in exactly the same manner as the preceding
narrative. We join the story just as the controller has repeated his "cleared
3 "for the ap_Foach over the objection of the pilot
"...I then told the controllers..we would have to stay at 6000...and
we would be too high to complete a safe approach and landing. His
reply was to the effect that we were cleared to 2600 feet then.
...we began a rapid descent and made a successful landing. The field
was VFR or we would not have attempted such a descent so close
in...".
A general aviation pilot, in IMC at dusk, reported being cleared for
an ILS approach fr_n an airway intersection with no published route for
transition. Rather than confront the issue, he requested clearance to a
nearby VOR and a VOR approach from that fix.
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In another incident, Center turned over a corporate pilot to a VFR
tower, with no approach clearance. Since the to_er had n_)authority to issue
an instrume, t approach clearance, the pilo[ was forced Lo revert to VFR. The
weather was, in fact, VMC-presumably known to the center controller but not
discussed with the pilot.
The remaining three cases in this category concern clearances with an
unspoken restriction of vital concern to the pilot. In one of these, an air
carrier aircraft on a SID at night in IMC was told to turn right "when able"
for radar vectors while at 7000 feet:
"...According to the SID instructions, a right turn was not to be
made until passing (name) intersection and 9500 feet, presumably
because of high terrain to the west. None of the cockpit crew mem-
bers had ever heard the phrase "when able" with respect to a heading
change. So we queried the controller about the clearance and the
terrain (which could not be seen). He replied in an irritated and
arrogant tone with 'Sir, that is a legal clearance'. While the
clearance may have been legal, it was ambiguous t_ us and potentially
dangerous. Certainly we were able to _._ake the turn, but such a head-
ing might have taken us dangerously close to high terrain. So_lewhat
perplexed, i replied that we were 'unable' and continued to fly the
published SID .... "
Another air carrier aircraft, flying a STAR profile at night, was
cleared to descent to I0,000 feet "at pilot's discretion":
"...Upon inspection of the STAR, we discovered that at our position
on the STAR tile MEA was 16,500 feet. I think that this is a poten-
tially dangerous situation, especially for people who do not fly this
part of the country on a regular basis. I do not think that most
pilots realize their responsibility to review MEA's when given a
clearance like the one we were given .... "
In a call-back, the reporter stated that they if they had begun their
descent when cleared they would have reach I0,000 feet while still in the
16,500 MEA area. The controller apparently assumed that the pilot would
adjust his aescent profile accordingly.
In the final incident of this category, a 3000 hour general aviation
pilot objected to being cleared "after takeoff turn left 200 degrees", noting
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that such a heading was directly toward a high ridge in close proximity to the
airport. When queried, the controller replied that he meant to turn at the
pilot's discretion after maintaining runway heading to a sufficient altitude.
Given legal but disconcerting clearance: The eight reports (seven
incidents and one situation) in this category are peculiar in that no actual
error or FAR violation is evident. Yet, each describes circumstances which
were disconcerting enough te the reporting pilots to warrant the submission of
an ASRS report.
All of the reporters were professional pilots, six of them employed
by air carriers, while two are Air Taxi pilots. All of the report described
occurrences on IFR flights.
The lighting and meteorological conditions for the seven incidents in
this category are given in table 12.
TABLE 12. LIGHTING AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR
INCIDENTS IN WHICH FLIGHT CREWS WERE GIVEN
LEGAL BUT DISCONCERTING CLEARANCES
IMC VMC Unk Total s
Day 0 3 0 3
Night 3 0 0 3
Unk 0 0 I 1
Totals 3 3 1 7
Three of these incidents arose because of an infommation gap between
controllers and pilots with regard to minimum altitude limits. In particular,
pilots are generally unfamiliar with minimum vector altitudes and may feel
uncomfortable when vectored, quite properly, below the minimum altitude dis-
played on the charts available to them. In one case, an FAA check pilot,
riding with the reporting pilot, demanded a climb to the published minimum
altitude. In another, an air carrier pilot's confidence was even further
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shattered when the GPWS went off on radar vectors over hilly terrain after
descending 700 feet below the Jepp chart minimum altitude. As the controller
had intended, the aircraft was actLal!y 100 feet above the MVA. On the third,
but somewhat different instance, a perplexed air carrier pilot found himself
trying to resolve three diverse minimum altitude restrictions at night in IMC:
"I requested and was given a route from my position on V-45 airway
(which has an MEA of 2000 feet) direct to the outer locator (which
has a procedure turn minimum altitude of 2100 feet). However, the
minimum safe terrain altitude is 2600 feet..."
An air carrier pilot reported being disturbed by a GPWS alert while
crossing a ridge at 10,500 feet, even though the weather was VMC in daylight.
The radar altimeter showed a 1500 foot clearance, a legal margin since the
aircraft was on radar vectors.
Two other reporting pilots expressed concern over radar vectors in
mountainous terrain. One, a 5000-hour air taxi pilot objected to two
instances of radar vectors off airways at night in IMC"
"In both instances, weather was solid IMC...We were given radar vec-
tors...and were not told the purpose...nor was there much communica-
tion from that time on .... This procedure is ambiguous at best and
takes the aircraft close to (mountain). In both instances I repeat-
edly asked the controller when we would be turned back toward the
airway or VOR because of the length of time between communications
and in both instances I felt as though I had been forgotten..."
In another report, the Captain of a wide-body air carrier aircraft
made a strong plea for the implementation of SID's and STAR'S to replace the
extensive radar vectoring at a particular site in mountainous terrain:
"...Upon arrival at (name) on the first flight, I was appalled to
find that so much faith was placed upon the radar vector as an arri-
val and departure handling technique, and the attendant necessity for
continuous radio communication. After several flights I 'learned'
the arrival and departure patterns of radar vectors and it is their
consistency which causes me to submit this report...It would be crim-
inal to allow a crash to occur just because communications were
interrupted."
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In a very detailed report, another air carrier pilot took exception
to a last-minute change to an impromptu off-airway clearance at night which he
found very disconcerting:
"...The weather was poor with rain, low ceilings, turbulence, iso-
lated embedded thunderstorms, gusty surface winds .... &s we were
cleared for takeoff, the tower advised us to 'turn right to heading
180 degrees, maintain 6000 feet'. I didq't like this last minute
change to our clearance as it, in my judgement, negated our previous
routing without providing us with any new definitive routing to our
destination airport. However, I accepted it because of the pressure
of the takeoff .... departure control advised us to report receiving
the (name) VOR satisfactorily for 'direct'. This was not part of our
original clearance route .... ! questioned the adequacy of the 6000
foot altitude assignment because I noted an 8000 foot MEA to our left
and 5687 foot terrain on the area chart .... I was in no position at
the time (dark, rain, turbulence, on instruments) to be plotting a
course on the chart to deten;line compliance with FAR 91.199(a)(2)(i).
I felt uneasy...so I asked the coast controller if we were in radar
contact. He muddled some reply...so I specifically asked him if 6000
feet was adequate for our assigned route. He then fell silent where-
upon I began to feel very uncomfortable. After a couple of attempts
to raise him, I said that I either wanted a radar vector or I would
take necessary action (i.e., a climb to 8000 feet without a clear-
ance). He responded by 'turn right to a heading of 250 degrees for a
vector to .... It was apparent to me that I was neither 'fish nor
foul'... I wasn't on an actual radar vector but I was assigned an
off-airway route at ATC's request .... I am confident, in retrospect,
that my altitude and route assignments were safe and in compliance
with the requirements of FAR 91. But I also know that I was in no
position at the time to detemine the adequacy of the route and alti-
tude when it counted, and I had the feeling the controllers didn't
really know either...".
In the final incident in this category, the pilot of another air
carrier aircraft objected to the tower's routing while circling to land after
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a runway conflict developed while he was on a 2-1/2 mile final. Although the
weather was VMCin daylight, the guidance provided by the tower required
several abrupt turns at low-altitude. The pilot observed that while the
maneuverwas within the parameters of safety, it waswell outside the limits
of comfort for all concerned.
Given a heading toward higher terrain: The five incidents in this
category have in commonthe receipt of an ATCIFR clearance which, in the
opinion of the reporter, could have placed the aircraft in a position without
adequate terrain clearance. In no case did the aircraft actually enter the
potentially hazardous area. In three of the cases, the pilot refused the
clearance; while in the remaining two, the flight path was altered by ATC
before the suspected hazard was encountered.
Three of the reports were by air carrier pilots, one from a general
aviation pilot, and one from a controller. The lighting and meteorological
conditions are given in table 13.
TABLE13. LIGHTINGANDMETEOROLOGICALONDITIONSFOR
INCIDENTSIN WHICHFLIGHTCREWSWEREGIVEN
A HEADINGTOWARDHIGHERTERRAIN
VMC IMC Total s
Day 3 i 4
Night 1 0 1
Totals 4 i 5
In one instance, a general aviation pilot on radar vectors under day-
light VMCconditions, becameconcerned that his vector would impact terrain a
few miles ahead. The controller disagreed, insisting the altitude was safe.
The pilot, unconvinced but nowwithin about two miles of the ridge, requested
and received a heading change.
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An air carrier pilot, on a published departure route in IMC, received
a suggestion to turn to a heading which would pemT_it an inbound aircraft to
make a straight-in a2proach, but which would also lead into mour_tainous ter-
rain. When asked if he could guarantee terrain clearance, the controller only
promised to do his best. Unsatisfied with this warranty, the pilot refused
the new heading and continued on the published route.
Another air carrier pilot, departing in daylight VMC conditions from
an airport in a "bowl", was concerned about the hot-day performance of his
aircraft. He refused a clearance to maintain runway heading after takeoff
because such a course was directly toward a 4000 foot mountain. Unable to get
a modified IFR clearance fr_ll the controller, he took off VFR to provide his
own navigation out of the area.
In the sole report by a controller, a situation was reported wherein
a particular published departure, at his facility, is frequently amended to
maintain 5000 feet while approaching an intersection with a crossin_
restriction of 7000 feeL. "ne departure controller apparently issues the
altitude restriction for initial traffic separation, with the intention of
lifting the restriction later. The reporting controller objected to this
practice because a delay in coLm:lunication could result in an aircraft
penetrating high-terrain airspace below the MEA.
In the final report of this category, an air carrier pilot objected
to radar vectors below nearby mountains at night:
"...cleareJ fro_ 11,000 feet to 9000 feet on heading of 240 degrees,
which would cause aircraft to meet high terrain 9300 feet and 9200
feet southwest of the a_rport. Controller said they used this
procedure all the time during VMC conditions. We didn't know we were
operating under VMC conditions nor were we given lost communications
instructions."
Cleared with impaired ILS: Five reports described instances whereby,
in the opinion of the reporter, pilots were not adequately warned about an
impai_ent of the ILS syst_,, or in which the Iocalizer was rendered erratic
because of aircraft on the ground.
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In the worst case of an information failure, a yeneral aviation pilot
reported bei_,g cleared in "hard" IMCfor an ILS approach while the system was
out of service according to a current NOTA_.
Two air carrier pilots objected to the use of the terminology
"cleared for ILS approach" where the glide slope is out of service, apparently
having encountered instances in which neither the terminal controller nor the
ATIS message provided a warninj.
The remaining two reports in this category described situations in
which aircraft were permitted into critical areas on the ground while other
aircraft were on final approach using the ILS system. One of these reports
was from a tower controller whose efforts to stop the practice, on a
particular night, were over-ruled because no actual system deviation was
occurring (not Category II). A similar situation report eloquently expressed
the feelings of an air carrier pilot:
"...During a recent three week period, I have conducted five
approaches below Cat. I limits, typically I00 obscured and RVR's
ranging from 1500 to 2200 feet .... In four of five, there was
localizer displacement or waffling at low altitudes caused,
apparently, by other aircraft on the ground disturbinj the localizer.
Some specific examples follow. (Date and place), daytime, 1600
RVR...saw lights at approximately 170 feet, some localizer waffling
at about 300. (Date and place), night, I00 obscured, 2200 RVR...at
about 300 feet, severe swinging of the localizer started, causing 15
degree banks to each side...very nearby ended upon the lights.
...(Date and place)...lO0 obscured, RVR 1600...the localizer became
erratic again at about 300 feet...took a missed approach. On the
second approach, ...tower cleared another aircraft to depart and he
was rolling as we passed about 600 feet, which again caused the
localizer to swing...As far as l'm concerned, there is little or no
margin for error during these low visibility approaches, coupled with
an apparent feeling of complacency by nearby everyone .... It is sheer
madness to clear an aircraft for take-off when there is someone on
approach inside the outer marker .... A corollary problem is the fuzzy
area between Cat. I and Cat. II approaches. It is very common for
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the visibility to be up and downfrequently, crossing the border
between the two realms.... there are sterile areas on all Cat. II
airports wherein aircraft are not permitted during Cat. II opera-
tions, but where they are permitted during Cat. I operations...
throwing in an erratic localizer really loads up the crew..."
Miscellaneous: Two singular cases were reported. Oneinvolved a
general aviation aircraft which lost radio contact with ATCfor an extended
period in mountainous terrain, but the aircraft was apparently in VMC,so no
serious terrain hazard existed. In the other instance, a mulitary trainer was
given an erroneous altimete_ setting during descent, which resulted in an
unsafe initial approach altitude in IMC.
Type III Reports
The reports in Type III are those in which a reporter alleges that
the design of airspace, air traffic and aircraft procedures or published
information relating thereto is deficient and presents the hazard of collision
_vith terrain or obstacles.
Some27 unique situation/occurrences are in this group. This repre-
sents approximately I0 percent of the total numberof reports in the CFTT
study document set. Of these, only nine are classifiable as discrete occur-
rences; while 18 report situations. Unlike other types examined in this
study, the reporters are almost evenly divided amongpilots and controllers.
With one exception, there appears to be no particular geographic
correlation with the numberof Type III reports. The exception is the state
of Alaska, with eight reports - five of these from the Anchorage area. It
appears that a reason for the higher frequency of Alaskan reports m_y be the
unusually rugged terrain combined with, in somecases, relatively large dis-
tances between navigational aids.
Over the 52-months covered in this study, 1978 was the peak year for
Type III reports, providing 12 of the 27 reports.
For the most part, the problems reported in the Type 1ii classifica-
tion are of such a nature that the fix, if appropriate, is unique to a
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specific location. For this reason, these reports will not be treated in as
much individual detail as in the preceding Type I and Type II incidents.
The distribution of reports, with respect to the general type of
problem, is given in table 14.
TABLE 14. GENERAL NATURE OF PROBLEMS
DESCRIBED IN TYPE Ill REPORTS
Problem Area Number of Reports
Design/Configuration
Airspace
ATC Procedure
Aircraft Operational Proced.
Subtotal
5
6
1
T_
Published Information
Ambiguous 8
In Error 2
Absent 5
Subtotal I-_
T_tal Problems 27
Situation reports. The specific deficiencies reported in general
situations of Type III are summarized in table 15.
Occurrence reports. Nine of the Type Ill reporters described spe-
cific instances to support their points of view. For example, an air carrier
pilot observed that a particular approach plate notation should be made more
prominent.
"...There was a line of thunderstorms in the area...I looked at the
36L Approach Plate. I did not see the small print in the right
center...As we got closer to the VOR...the line of thunderstorms
seemed to fill in and be intensifying and was in the shape of a
horseshoe with us in the center...We were level at 2000 feet and the
controller told us to turn right to 210 degrees. I looked at the
TABLE15.
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SUMMARYOFALLEGATIONSIN TYPEIll SITUATIONREPORTS
- Published procedure doesn't provide terrain clearance
- Proposed profile descent procedure ambigious
- Chart shows inaccurate MEA
- Published missed-approach procedure could lead to terrain conflict
- Chart ambigious on COP's and MEAgaps
- Departure procedure could lead to terrain with communication failure
- Pilot ignorance of MVA's leads to blind clearance acceptance
- Published departure procedure gives low performance aircraft a terrain
problem
- MEAtoo high, leads to steep approaches
- Companyflight operations manual doesn't provide for safe operation at
airport
- Published procedure ambigious in regard to minimumaltitude
- Pilots on IFR flight plans cruise below MEAwhenVFRon top
- Local procedure requires tower controller to clear aircraft below MVA
- Radar video maplacks critical points
Charts don't show 500 foot offshore drilling rigs
- ATIS doesn°t mention cranes near runway
- Airway dimensional tolerances invalid in Alaska
- Ship-in-channel procedure will lead to go-arounds
radar and told the controller...210 degrees looked the worst and I
asked if I could head 180 degrees for 5 or 6 minutes then turn
left...He said 'approved'. As we were going through the line the
First Officer told the controller we were heading Southeast...and
the controller asked if we saw the towers at 12 o'clock. Welooked
49
up and saw the towers through the rain at our immediate left front.
Both I and the First Officer pulled back on the yolk and climbed to
2500 feet..."
A general aviation pilot misread his chart, picking up the altitude
for initiating a turn which was for the opposite direction runway. He sug-
gested that the altitude restriction should be a specific part of the depar-
ture clearance.
In another case, a complicated SID contributed to a foreign air
carrier aircraft being discovered Dy a controller at 5000 feet in a 6700 foot
MVA area.
A controller reported that an aircraft made an approach below mini-
mums at his facility, but there was some uncertainty regarding what the
correct minimums were. Components of the ItS system had been out cf service
for nine months, but the approach charts had not been changed to reflect the
impaired system.
An air carrier pilot objected to initial approach radar vectors over
mountainous terrain where the MVA is sufficiently low that his GPWS was
activated.
The pilot of a floatplane observed an uncharted obstruction, in the
form of telephone wires across a river, just in time to avoid collision by
making a hard landing on the water.
One occurrence report presented convincing evidence that the MVA in
one locale was not adequate. In fact, the MVA had been raised since the
reported incident occurred. There can be little doubt but that the GPWS
prevented a catastrophe in this incident:
"...on a radar vector to (name) the GPWS actuated with a red light
and 'Whoop-Whoop Pull Up'. At this time we were...at an assigned
altitude of 11,000 feet .... radio altimeter was observed to pass
2500 feet rapidly and power was initiated, climb attitude estab-
lished. The radio altimeter passed through 800 feet and gradually
started up during the climb .... there was a deep low (trough) aloft,
and...the aircraft was 1400 feet lower than indicated.,."
At the time of the incident, the _IVA was intended to provide a 1000-
foot margin. In the reporter's opinion, even a revised 2000-foot margin was
not entirely adequate.
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An air taxi pilot in Alaska reported a controller informed him that
he was 10 miles off the center of an airway when his VOR indicator was cen-
tered. He felt that an MEA below the minimum reception altitude was dangerous
because of high terrain on both sides.
In the final Type Ill occurrence, a controller admitted being unable
to answer a pilot's question regarding the proper flight segment altitude for
a published departure route. The pilot selected an alternate route instead.
The culprit was the unusually complex and detailed information necessitated by
the terrain surrounding the Alaskan site.
Type IV Reports
Type IV reports are those in which it is alleged that inadequate,
nonexistent, or misleading lighting and/or marking of obstructions posed a
hazard to aerial navigation.
There were 24 reports of this type, or approximately 9 percent of the
total CFTT study document set. Of these, 7 are classified as occurrences
while the remaining 17 are classified as situation reports. These reports
were submitted almost exclusively by pilots.
While it may not be statistically significant, the San Francisco Bay
area provided three of the 24 Type IV reports, more than any other
geographical area.
The reporting frequency of Type IV reports is very peaked. None were
received in 1976. The greatest number (50 percent) were received in 1977.
The remaining 50 percent were spread fairly evenly over the next three years.
This characteristic is true for both the situation and the occurrence reports.
Situation reports. Although all Type IV reports are very
site-specific, there is a commonality among a few reports which permits some
grouping into generic classes. For the situation reports, the generic classes
ef problems are listed in table 16.
TABLE16.
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PROBLEMSDESCRIBEDIN TYPEIV SITUATIONREPORTS
Problem Numberof Reports
Failure to replace burned out marker
lights on towers
Poor visibility of towers which have
functioning lights
Towers without markings or lights
Lighted objects which look like the
airport environment
Towers whose height or location makes
them a hazard
Unmarkedwires near an airport
Unmarkedcrane operatin G near airport
Tall trees on approach course to runway
4
3
2*
2
*One report deals with a "trap" in which an unlighted tower exists next to a
lighted one.
Occurrence reports. Five of the severl Type IV occurrence reports
described near-misses with radio or television towers which were lighted, but
not adequately. The pilot of a corporate jet, circling to land at night,
narrowly avoided a 436 foot towe_ just 1 1/2 miles from the airport. An
observer in the cockpit spotted the tower, which was difficult to discern from
a background of city lights. In another incident, a light plane pilot
cruising at 1000 feet at dusk had a near-miss with towers that are 1049 feet
high, six miles from an airport. Similarly, a pilot reported several
instances wherein he observed light aircraft pulling up suddenly to avoid four
505 foot towers located 1.2 nautical miles from the threshold of a runway.
The fourth report described a near-miss with 1031 foot television towers, also
in the vicinity of an airport.
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The sole report of this group by a controller described two
incidents, in marginal VFR weather, which involved two separate towers in his
area, each allnost 2000 feet AGL:
"...The first was an enroute aircraft who called for advisories...He
was identified I mile from the antenna west of town, 500 feet below
the top of it. He was unaware of it and was given an i_nediate
vector to avoid impact. The second occurrence was with a VFR
aircraft that departed southbound. He proceded towards the antenna
south of town and was given information and vectors to avoid it. He
passed within 2 miles of the antenna without seeing it, and indicated
surprise that it was there .... "
Significantly, none of the ubiquitous antenna towers in these reports
were equipped with high-intensity strobe lighting.
One report described a problem with an antenna tower whose "dim red
lights" had been out of service for several months at the time the report was
submitted. To make matters even worse, the obstac!e was loca_ed on top of a
mountain within a heavily used corridor between higher terrain and a TCA.
The final Type IV report was submitted by a reporter who claimed to
be just one of ten pilots who, to his knowledge, have missed a particular
smokestack by a wingspan or less. The stack was lighted by a spotlight, but
was difficult to see against the background at night. The obstacle in
question is located lJ4 mile from a runway and just I00 yards from the
centerline.
Type V Reports
The Type V reports are those in which it is alleged that a hazard
exists because of the absence, improper design, or inappropriate operation of
enroute and landing aids.
Some 52 unique situation/occurrence reports were found to fit the
definition above. This represents about 20 percent of the total CFTT study
document set. Most of these reports (35) are descriptions of situations,
while 17 are classifiable as occurrences. Approximately 70 percent were
submitted by pilots, and the remainder by controllers. There is no
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significant correlation of the number of reports and any particular
geographical location.
A majority of these reports (76 percent) described perceived hazards
during the final approach flight phase.
The number of reports of this type peaked in 1977 with 38 percent of
the repurts submitted in that year.
Situation reports. The complaints contained in the 35 situation
reports are classified in table 17.
TABLE 17. CLASSIFICATION OF TYPE V SITUATION REPORTS
Compl ai nt Number of Reports
Inadequate Glide Path Cues (Black Hole Effect)
No VASI
VASI out of service
Poor quality VASI
VASI path too close to power lines
Subtotal
Unreliable ILS
Shortened Approach Lighting System
Mi scel Ianeous
Poor communication with ATC
Poor location of LOM
Unreliable ATC radar
Non-standard ILS/DME
Airport critical area being reduced
Adequate weather data not available
ATIS not informative on status of ILS
Subtotal
10
7
3
I
_T
1
1
1
i
1
i
1
-7
Total 35
As evident in table 17, two thirds of the situation reports cite the
hazards associated with night approaches without adequate visual guidance in
the form of a suitable VASI. Almost half of the VASI complaints were
submitted by air carrier pilots.
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Aside fr_:_ the four reports of unreliable ILS indications and the
three reports objecting to a shortening of the approach lighting system, the
remainin_ situation reports are very site-s_ecific.
Occurrence reports. Unlike the situation reports, the specific
occurrences are weighted heavily toward hazards which occurred during ILS
approaches. Reports of ILS incidents account for 13 of the 17 reports.
Four incidents were reported in which shut-downs for maintenance were
not properly coordinated, at least not with the flight crews who were using
the system at the time.
The pilot of a wide-body air carrier aircraft described an approach
to a major airport with the ceiling reported as 700 feet, broken:
"...approximately 2 1/2 miles from touchdown, 800 feet AGL, glide
slope disappeared from both instruments on Captain's and First
Officer's panel. PAFAM communicated 'Take Over', and N]mber 2
autopilot, which was in use for approach, dropped off. First Officer
continued approach manually...After landing, tower asked if flight
had lost glide slope during approach...advised that maintenance was
performing ground checks..."
In a very similar incident, a maintenance technician turned off the
ILS while an air carrier aircrafL was on a three-mile final in heavy
precipitation, causing a missed approach.
In the two other shut-down incidents, the maintenance procedure was
coordinated with ATC but took place at inopportune times. In one of these
cases, the weather was "indefinite ceiling zero, sky obscured, visibility one
sixteenth, fog, forecast to improve".
One ILS-related occurrence report questioned the wisdom of having the
localizers for different runways on the same frequency at the same airport. A
wide-body air carrier aircraft was cleared for a visual approach to _unway IL
with no mention by either the controller or the ATIS that the IL ILS was out
of service. The aircraft received spurious signals from the Runway 19
localizer, which is on the same frequency. In VMC conditions, a normal
landing was made despite a warning from the GPWS that the aircraft was belou
the glide slope.
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Twocases were reported wherein erratic glide slope behavior raised
havoc during coupled approaches. In the more serious of these:
"Category II approach. Autepilot followed fluctuation of glide path
between I00 to 150 feet that resulted in excessive pitch down.
Autopilot disconnected, power add_-!, qose raised. Hard landing
resulted barely on the threshold..."
An errant glide slope component figured prominently in three other
occurrence reports. In one, an ai_ carrier pilot in VMC flew an entire
approach with the glide slope needle centered and no flags showing only to
discover that the indicator remained centered all the way to the parking area.
The problem was in the glide slope transmitter. In another incident, the
approach coupler on a wide-body aircraft locked on to a multiple glide slope
signal. The crew realized that they had not yet crossed the outer marker and
initiated a go-around at 800 feet. In the third case, the glide slope
indicator in another wide-body aircraft gave an obviously erroneous indication
at the outer marker. The tower monitor showed no problem existing, but the
monitor was later found to be incorrect.
Three other reports were concerned with ILS problems. In one, a
controller regorted the system inoperative, for an unspecified reason, for
five minutes with three aircraft at some stage of the approach. Another
controller co,nplained that the ILS at his facility behaved erratically in
heavy rain, as did the runway lights. In the last, an air carrier pilot
reported executing a missed approach because of an anomaly in the localizer
course as he approached minimums.
Two reports were received which complained of deficiencies in the
lighting system. One of these was from an air carrier pilot:
"ILS approach to Runway 28. Sequence flashes were bright and quite a
distraction when aircraft descended below the clouds on a foggy,
rainy night. (Weather 300 overcast, I mile in rain and fog.)
Requested tower to..."kill the rabbit". When he turned off the
sequence flashers, the entire approach light system was extinguished,
Controller was apologetic, but the only way he could turn off the SFL
was to turn off the MALSR servicing the airport .... "
The other lighting complaint was from a general aviation pilot and
concerned a night landing at an uncontrolled airport:
56
"...Runway 36 has trees and a power line at the approach end, so I
elected to make my approach to Runway IS where there were no
obstructions. When I turned final, I adjusted my descent to land o_
the green threshold lights. Approximately 25 feet above ground, as I
was beginning to flare, I sensed something was wrong so I executed a
go-around. After circling the airport, I realized what had hapi)ened.
The airport had no threshold lights on Runway 18. The green lights
that I had seen were the threshold lights of Runway 36 which could be
seen from both directions. This, coupled with the fact that
approximately one third of the Runway IS lighting was not visible
(burned out), led me to believe that I was approaching a displaced
threshold on Runway 18..."
Only one occurrence report concerned enroute navigational aids. A
controller described the incident, which happened at dusk in IMC.
"...I observed a target on radar approximately IS miles west of
centerline of (vector airway) on a heading which would take the
aircraft to Mount (name). I established radio and radar contact and
advised pilot of his position .... He...only showed a couple miles
left of course. This has happened three times in ten days to three
different aircraft."
In the final Type V report, it was alleged that a reportable accident
of a corporate aircraft was due, in part, to the fact that control of traffic
at a particular site should be re-delegated to a different radar facility for
better coverage.
Type VI Reports
Type Vl reports are those in which it is alleged that a GPWS or MSAW
alarm occurred under inappropriate conditions. In the opinion of the
reporters, these false alarms can cause potentially serious problems in the
cockpit. Moreover, they reduce the credibility of the alarm systems.
There were 29 unique occurrences, or about II percent of all the
reports in the CFTT study document set. Some $3 percent of these were
submitted by pilots, the remainder by controllers.
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The false alarms occurred most frequently during the final approach
flight phase (67 percent) with descent and initial approach each accounting
for an additional 14 percent.
Information concerning aircraft and operator characteristics was
missing from about 17 percent of the reports. Of the remainder, the reports
dealt almost exclusively with air-carrier operated, transport-category
aircraft.
The prevailing flight conditions are given in table 18.
TABLE 18. PREVAILING CONDITIONS IN TYPE Vl REPORTS
Meteorological Lighting
Flight Plan Number Conditions Number Conditions Number
IFR 25
Unk 4
IMC 8 Night 5
VMC 12 Day 15
Mixed I Both 1
Unk 8 Dusk I
Unk 7
The number of reports of this type peaked in 1978, with the incidence
of these reports considerably reduced in the last two years. The reporting
frequency, by year, is listed in table 19.
All of the Type VI reports described occurrences, as opposed to
general situation reports received in some of the other categories treated in
this study. One of these was unique in that it was not truly a false alarm,
but a manifestation of system damage. In this incident, a large but
unfortunate bird was struck by the glide slope receiving antenna on the
aircraft, causing a "Pull Up" aural GPWS alarm at low altitude on final
approach.
The other 28 reports are summarized in table 20.
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TABLE19. REPORTINGFREQUENCYFORGPWSANDMSAWFALSEALARMS
YEAR GPWS MSAW BOTH TOTAL
1976 (last six months) 5 0 0 5
1977 2 4 0 6
1978 6 4 I 11
1979 2 2 0 4
1980 (first ten months) I 2 0 3
TABLE20. COMPLAINTSOF REPORTERSOFTYPEVl INCIDENTS
Reporters Complaint Numberof Reports
Distraction and loss of confidence 15
No problem indicated 5
Concern that pull-up would cause mid-air collision 4
"Low Altitude" callout as result of MSAWalarm misleading 2
Cockpit communication blocked 1
Loss of airspeed from distraction 1
While all of the reports represent a cause for concern, only two
portrayed a serious occurrence where the false alarm led to somegenuine
difficulties. In one early incident (1976) an air carrier aircraft was on
final approach with only partial flap deflection because of a flap system
problem. Although the situation was well under control by the crew, the GPWS
was triggered to a "pull-up" alert about two miles from the runway. In the
words of the reporting pilot:
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"...since the audio level is extremely high, all cockpit and tower
communications were blocked at this point in time, speed call-outs,
sink rate call-outs, height above runway call-outs were not possible.
This, in effect, denied a coordinated crew function .... "
In the other serious incident, a spurious GPWS warning received on
short final in gusty winds caused sufficient distraction to permit a critical
loss of airspeed with a difficult recovery.
DISCUSSION
In the preceding section, the 258 reports comprising the study
document set have been summarized, without comment, and placed in categories
intended to delineate certain common circumstances. In this regard, the
previous section can stand alone as a factual account of what is contained in
the ASRS files, pertinent to CFTT hazards.
For the most part, the reports must speak for themselves. While all
of them can be classified by their superficial similarities, few, if any, are
alike in detail. For this reason, a specific summarization of such parameters
as causal and recovery factors would not only be difficult, it would be of
questionable value. Instead, this section will deal primarily with general
impressions obtained during the course of the study.
Human Error in CFTT Incidents
If the 29 reports of erroneous MSAW or GPWS alerts in Type VI are
omitted, there were 159 discrete occurrences (as opposed to situations) in the
study document set. Human error is the greatest single causal factor in these
remaining CFTT incidents, producin_ I01, or 64% of the total number of
occurrence reports.
Of the Type I incidents, in which inappropriate flight crew action
precipitated the occurrence, 70% are directly chargeable to human error,
primarily simple errors of execution. A very few of these, perhaps three,
produced errors which can only be described as blunders. In two of the Type I
set, the blunders prevailed despite the presence of other crew members and the
clearance read-back to a controller.
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Most of the humanerror incidents are of Type II, wherein unsafe
clearances were issued by controllers in 8!% of the occurrences. In the vast
majority of those cases, the underlying reason for the error is not revealed.
The remaining human errors were reflected in the untimely and
uncoordinated shut down of ILS equipment (4 cases) and the MSAW system (1
case).
The Role of GPWS and MSAW in CFTT Incidents
The GPWS or the MSAW equipment functioned properly in 24 occurrences
examined in this study. Indeed, the first warning of danger came from one of
these systems in 18 cases, 10 from the GPWS and 8 from the MS_W alert.
In the opinion of the authors, a disaster would have occurred in six
instances, were it not for the timely warning of these systems. GPWS and MSAW
each accounted for three of those probable saves. This is a conservative
estimate, since the seriousness of some of the other occurrences is difficult
to judge, particularly those reported by controllers in the Type II category.
Further evidence of the efficacy of the GPWS and MSAW systems was
found in a separate study by the authors* of accidents in the United States,
or to U.S. carriers, in which air carrier aircraft were flown into terrain
with no _rior awareness on the part of the crew of the impending disaster. In
the years 1971-1975 (pre GPWS/MSAW), there were 17 such accidents; while in
the period 19)6-1980 (post GPWS/MSAW), there were two (In one of the latter, a
GPWS alarm was sounded, but ignored). Employing a standard statistical test,
it was concluded that the probability of this dramatic reduction being
coincidental is less than seven in one million.
Several of the 29 incidents of inappropriate alarms (Type VI) imply
that pilots are much more aware of the negative aspects (false alarms) of
these systems than they are of their demonstrated worth. In the words of one
reportipg pilot "...It is my opinion that the GPWS is much more likely to
cause an accident than it is to prevent one..." The results of this
investigation, and the study cited above, indicate to the contrary.
*Loomis, J. P. and Porter, R. F., "The Perfon,_ance of Warning Syste;_,s in
Avoiding Controlled-Flight-lnto-Terrain (CFIT) Accidents", 1981 Symposium on
Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 20-22, 1981.
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At the same time, the legitimacy of the complaints, contained in the
Type Vl category, must be recognized. There is no doubt that frequent
inappropriate alarms tend to degrade the effectiveness of the systems by
reducing confidence in their veracity. It is also clear that legitimate ATC
procedures, such as vectoring aircraft at or near th MVA over undulating
terrain, can routinely create false GPWS alarms and that these can create crew
distraction with potentially hazardous effects.
Radar Vectors and Off-Airways Routing
Some 46 reports described incidents which occurred during radar
vectoring, principally during departures and arrivals in mountainous terrain.
It may be inferred that pilots are not comfortable when heavy reliance is
placed on controllers, often busy with other aircraft, for navigation and
terrain avoidance. This attitude is supported by the ten cases of aircraft
being forgotten or ignored while on radar vectors.
One report, in particular, made a strong plea for the establishment
of more SID's and STAR's at a particular site. It may be significant that
only three incidents were reported concerning aircraft on published SID's (all
pilot errors) and no incidents on STAR's. On the other hand, six of the radar
vectoring incidents occurred when controllers preempted a published transition
with vectors.
While it is always the responsibility of the flight crew to mantain
an awareness of position relative to surrounding terrain, it is apparent that
the reporting pilots would be much more comfortable with published routes when
a terrain hazard is present. Aside from the radar vector instances, this
point is also forcibly presented in one particular report regarding an
off-airways amended clearnace.
It should be noted that the comments promoting the value of published
routes, SID's, and STAR's, support the findings of Harris (1975)*.
A contributing factor to the pilot's aversion _o radar vectors is the
fact that he generally does not have access to information regarding MVA's.
When an altitude assignment is received which is lower than the minimum
*Harris, R. M., "Review of Pilot and Controller ATC Responsibilities",
MTR-6954, Mitre Corporation, July, 1975.
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altitude indicated on his charts, he can only accept the clearance on faith -
a valuable redundancy in operational safety is no long present. This system
deficiency was also pointed out by Harris in 1975.
While on the subject of radar vectors, some notice must be taken of
the plight of the VFR pilot operating in a TCA. Unlike his IFR colleagues,
he does not enjoy the protection of the MVA, even if he knows what it is. In
five instances, the pilots alleged that they were vectored at an unsafe
altitude. By complying, they were presumably in violation of FAR Part 91, but
the same regulations forbed them from deviating from the ATC clearance. While
it is true that FAR 91.75A pe_Hts the pilot to question a clearance,
clarification is not always readily obtainable on congested frequencies.
Approach Clearance Ten,_inology
Unless the aircraft is established on a segment of a published route
or instrument approach procedure, FAR 91.I16(f) requires that, when an
approach clearance is received, a pilot shall maintain his last assigned
altitude unless a different altitude is assigned by ATC. Only two incidents
were reported in the United States in which an aircraft was "cleared for the
approach" without benefit of a proper transition altitude assignment. On the
other hand, two other reports indicate that procedures in other countries may
differ, and crews operating to foreign airports may be required to provide
their own transition altitudes to the final approach fix.
CO_CLUSI ONS
From a review of some 258 pertinent reports in the ASRS data base,
the following conclusions may be drawn concerning the observed hazards
conducive to collision with terrain:
(I) Human error is the single greatest identifiable cause of CFTT
incidents, being a causal factor in over 64% of the occurrences
in which some threat of terrain conflict was experienced.
Approximately two thirds of the human errors were attributed to
controllers, the most common discrepancy being a radar vector
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below the MVA. Errors by pilots were of a muchmore diverse
nature and included a few instances of gross deviations from
their assigned altitudes.
(2) Radar vectoring in mountainous terrain is particularly conducive
to controller errors. Radar vectoring was the occasion of 46
specific occurrences, while only three incidents arose on SID's
and none on STAR's that were not amendedby radar vectors off
the published profiles.
(3) A factor contributing to the aversion of manypilots to radar
vectoring in IMC is that pilots do not have information on MVA's
readily available. A radar vector below a minimumaltitude on
the pilots charts must be accepted on faith, removing a valuable
safety check.
(4) There can be little doubt that the GPWSand MSAWsystems have
been responsible for averting several catastrophic accidents to
air carrier aircraft. It seemsrelatively certain that a
disaster would otherwise have occurred in six incidents examined
in this study. In 12 other cases, one of these systems provided
the first warning of danger.
(5) Manypilots are apparently unawareof the effectiveness of the
GPWSand suffer from somedisbelief in its credibility as a
consequenceof false alerts.
(6) There is someevidence that an approach clearance to a runway
with the glide slope componentof the ILS out of service should
contain an explicit reminder of that fact. A particularly
insidious situation occurs whenthe glide slope anomaly does not
cause a flag to appear in the cockpit.
APPENDIX
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APPENDIX - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ADF
AGL
ARTS
ASR
ASRS
ATC
ATIS
CFIT
CFTT
COP
DME
FAA
FAF
FAR
FSS
GCA
GPWS
IFR
ILS
IMC
LOM
MALSR
MDA
MEA
MOCA
MSA
MSAW
MSL
MVA
NDB
NOTAM
RVR
SFL
SID
STAR
TCA
VASI
VFR
VMC
VOR
WAC
Automatic Direction Finder
Above Ground Level
Automatic Radar Terminal Systems
Aircraft Surveillance Radar
Aviation Safety Reporting System
Air Traffice Control
Automatic Terminal Information Service
Controlled Flight Into Terrain
Controlled Flight Toward Terrain
Change-Over Point
Distance Measuring Equipment
Federal Aviation Administration
Final Approach Fix
Federal Air Regulation
Flight Service Station
Ground Controlled Approach
Ground Proximity Warning System
Instrument Flight Rules
Instrument Landing System
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
Locater Outer Marker
Medium-intensity Approach Light System
Indicator Lights
Minimum Descent Altitude
Minimum Enroute Altitude
Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude
Minimum Safe Altitude
Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
Mean Sea Level
Minimum Vectoring Altitude
Non-Directional Beacon
Notices to Airmen
Runway Visual Range
Sequenced Flashing Lights
Standard Instrument Departure
Standard Terminal Arrival Route
Terminal Control Area
Visual Approach Slope Indicator
Visual Flight Rules
Visual Meteorological Conditions
Very High Frequency Omnidirectional
World Aeronautical Chart
with
Range
Runway
Station
Alignment

